The assumptions that subjects hold beliefs and that the chosen actions are not altered by a proper elicitation of these … beliefs are widely used in economics. In this paper I experimentally test whether the second assumption is correct. Especially … results in a significant increase of equilibrium play. Therefore the elicitation of beliefs can affect the choices made by …

coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal …

the game is accomplished using such concepts as p-beliefs and p-dominant strategy (Monderer and Samet, 1989, and Morris …

randomized survey experiment conducted in Argentina. Results show that providing information to citizens matters for shaping …

in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …

government performance and conduct a randomized survey experiment in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the incumbent …

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path …. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs …. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is …