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Vote buying or campaign promises? : electoral strategies when party credibility is limited

Hanusch, Marek; Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan - 2016

What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156

Political competition and legislative shirking in roll-call votes : evidence from Germany for 1953-2017

Frank, Marco; Stadelmann, David - 2020

We analyze the impact of elected competitors from the same constituency on legislative shirking in the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2017. The German electoral system ensures that there is always at least one federal legislator per constituency with a varying number of elected competitors from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301926

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887

Transparency and government reputation : an experiment on signaling

Otálvaro-Ramírez, Susana; Scartascini, Carlos G.; … - 2025

Transparency initiatives are well-known tools to foster trust and empower citizens. To explain why some governments introduce them but others do not, we model these initiatives as a signal that complements the information provided by visible government performance and conduct a randomized survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015197814

Lobbying and the power of multinational firms

Polk, Andreas; Schmutzler, Armin; Müller, Adrian - 2010

regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels … lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering. -- Multinational enterprises ; regulation ; policy formation … ; lobbying ; interest groups ; foreign direct investment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696003

Tax competition and the political economy of public employment : a model for Austria

Christl, Michael; Köppl-Turyna, Monika - 2017

In this work we simulate the effects of tax autonomy of the Austrian states on the levels of public employment in each state. We show that depending on the strength of the public sector lobby, tax autonomy would require reduction of employment in the public sector between 25% and 35% of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718756

Multilateral bargaining in networks : on the prevalence of inefficiencies

Lee, Joosung - 2015

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698

Voluntary agreements under endogenous legislative threats

Glachant, Matthieu - 2003

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589992

Institutions for effective business-government collaboration : micro mechanisms and macro politics in Latin America

Schneider, Ben Ross - 2013

What makes for effective cooperation between government and business in industrial policy? Core research questions on the institutional design of arrangements for business-government interactions focus on three main functions: i) maximizing the benefits of dialogue and information exchange; ii)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303253