Similar Search Results

Optimal afforestation contracts with asymmetric information on private environmental benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - 2004

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601121

Motivate and select : relational contracts with persistent types

Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2014

's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382180

Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2018

We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925624

Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost informationl

Di Corato, Luca; Moretto, Michele - 2024

We consider a long-term contractual relationship in which a buyer procures a fixed quantity of a product from a supplier and then sells it on the market. The production cost is private information and evolves randomly over time. The solution to this dynamic principal-agent problem involves a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478916

Optimal contracts when the players think different

Dumav, Martin; Khan, Urmee; Rigotti, Luca - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014429204

Delegating relational contracts to corruptible intermediarie

Troya-Martinez, Marta; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686297

Mandatory disclosure of managerial contracts in nonprofit organizations

Kopel, Michael; Marini, Marco - 2020

. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations … competing for donations in the fundraising market. Our aim is to investigate the impact of publicly available contract … information on fundraising competition of nonprofit organizations. We argue that, although such provision makes contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012383902

Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing … private information of the provider. We characterise the optimal dynamic contract and show that it is made up of two …, which is affected by both patient and hospital characteristics. To illustrate the characteristics of the dynamic contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2007

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452

Information design in multi-stage games

Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - 2018

We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872424