We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for shares and by potentially having several significant shareholders. The founder of the firm may optimally choose to distribute voting power to several large shareholders since this forces them to form...

Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized...

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy relevant information. The paper also shows a...

Interest groups can influence political decisions in two distinct ways: by offering contributions to political actors and by providing them with relevant information that is favorable for the group. We analyze the conditions under which interest groups are more inclined to use one or the other...

We provide a theoretical analysis of the relationship between investor protection and the performance of corporations with concentrated ownership and apply it to analyze two types of investor protection. First, we analyze the cost and benefits of imposing super-majority requirements on certain...

We investigate the patterns of ultimate distribution of ownership in a sample of small closely held corporations. Motivated by recent corporate governance theories we define control dilution as the absenc of a single dominating shareholder. Most firms have one or two ultimate owners implying...

We analyse the relationship between the distribution of ownership and the allocation of control in Danish closely held corporations. First, we investigate why firms have boards. Second, we identify relationships between owners, boardmembers and CEOs in these firms. Third, we show the presence of...

We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in...

In a world where corporate boards are not required by law, I identify a governance and a distribute motive for board establishment and board composition. I investigate the presence of these motives in a sample of 23.000+ closely held corporations. Board frequency increases with more owners, if...