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Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian - 2009 - Revised version

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise … ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as … risks, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies. -- Insurance Markets ; Adverse Selection ; Multidimensional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003900923

Deductible or co-insurance: which is the better insurance contract under adverse selection?

Breuer, Michael (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

form of an insurance contract to impose partial insurance of the low risks. This paper contributes to the discussion on … optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a … positive co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and buy the optimal insurance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001957148

Asymmetric information with multiple risks : the case of the Chilean private health insurance market

Mata, Dolores de la; Machado, Matilde P.; Olivella, Pau; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013454461

Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2018

We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925624

Do exit options increase the value-for-money of public-private partnership?

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2020

We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be financially loss-making. In a continuous-time setting with hidden information about operating profits, we show that an exit option, acting as a risk-sharing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195007

Endogenizing private information : incentive contracts under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521609

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

Gärtner, Dennis - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452

Dynamic regulation of public franchises with imperfectly correlated demand shocks

Buso, Marco; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2023

In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013547855

Adverse selection with the boot on the other foot : insurer insolvency as a problem in asymmetric information

Dai, Yuechen; Watt, Richard - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468951

Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening

Lund, Diderik; Nilssen, Tore - 2003

We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142264

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