Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games,...

We introduce a novel approach to studying behavior in repeated games - one that is based on the psychology of play. Our approach is based on the following six "aspects" of a player's behavior: round-1 cooperation, lenience, forgiveness, loyalty, leadership, and following. Using a laboratory...

I investigate numerically the following question: Given that individuals with different wages disagree over the optimal labour-income tax schedule, how would such disagreements be affected if society restricted itself to using linear tax schedules? I find that there would be (i) a decrease in...

This paper analyses a model in which employees are biased in their perception of their optimal contribution rates or asset allocations in defined contribution pension plans. The optimal default is characterised as a function of the parameters. It is shown that, for some values of the parameters,...

The analysis in Galperti and Strulovici (2017) relies on two axioms that appear normatively and descriptively very appealing. Notably, these two axioms, taken together with some standard axioms, imply a failure of dynamic consistency. The current comment argues that the two axioms are less...

I consider an extension of the Borda count to the case when individuals can have weak preferences, and I show that it satisfies several normatively appealing axioms. The first axiom is an extension to the case of weak preferences of the Modified Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom...

What is the optimal default contribution rate or default asset allocation in pension plans? Could active decision (i.e., not setting a default and forcing employees to make a decision) be optimal? These questions are studied in a model in which each employee is biased regarding her optimal...

The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual’s choices with commitment or in the moment are "better"....

Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically...