Showing 1 - 10 of 60
In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761367
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459202
I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746239
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279664
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279665
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409997
How society should deal with the self-strengthening Tech Giants is a muchdiscussed issue. We suggest to democratize them by giving users a say in their decisions. With newly-developed collective decision rules and user councils, democratization of Tech Giants becomes feasible.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012124605
We suggest that flexible majority rules for currency issuance decisions foster the stability of a cryptocurrency. With flexible majority rules, the voteshare needed to approve a particular currency issuance growth is increasing with this growth rate. By choosing suitable parameters for these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023545
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009236280
We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003762172