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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: A survey of experimental research

Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019

in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011030

Voting in international environmental agreements: Experimental evidence from the lab

Dannenberg, Astrid - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010

different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple … majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line … with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694111

More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not

Ockenfels, Axel; Gallier, Carlo; Sturm, Bodo - 2024

experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015211854

Collective minimum contributions to counteract the ratchet effect in the voluntary provision of public goods

Alt, Marius; Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2022

We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties' commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time and our results confirm that its effect is detrimental....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464275

The impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods

Kesternich, Martin; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2012

We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010308952

Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; … - 2007

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297914

Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

Sturm, Bodo; Riechmann, Thomas; Dannenberg, Astrid; … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297936

Do Equity Preferences Matter in Climate Negotiations? An Experimental Investigation

Dannenberg, Astrid; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten - 2007

This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297962

Stability and explanatory power of inequality aversion: an investigation of the house money effect

Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; … - 2010

In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain ("house money") or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. Moreover, we analyse whether the way of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299932

On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods: Experimental evidence from the lab

Dannenberg, Astrid; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2010

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300513