Given the vital and controversial debate on fairness concerns in international climate negotiations, the acceptance of a climate treaty may be fostered if the distribution of costs and benefits from global environmental protection is perceived to be "fair". Since an agreement must be acceptable...

In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the...

From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate change over time. Within this process,...

The political discussion on energy efficiency is focusing more and more on the building sector due to its susceptibility to potential market failures like the negative external pollution effects of CO2 emission. Using a discrete choice approach, this paper aims at deriving factors which increase...

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...

Within the framework of Monte Carlo experiments, this paper systematically compares different versions of the simulated z-test (using the GHK simulator) in one- and multiperiod multinomial probit models. One important finding is that, in the flexible probit models, the tests on parameters of...

This paper compares different versions of the simulated counterparts of the Wald test, the score test, and the likelihood ratio test in the multiperiod multinomial probit model. Monte Carlo experiments show that the simple form of the simulated likelihood ratio test delivers the most favorable...

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...