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Error-prone inference from response time : the case of intuitive generosity in public-good games

Recalde, María P.; Riedl, Arno; Vesterlund, Lise - In: Journal of public economics 160 (2018), pp. 132-147

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035361

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2009

Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871980

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937641

Institution formation in public goods games

Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - In: The American economic review 99 (2009) 4, pp. 1335-1355

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003896744

Enforcement on contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and economic behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 122-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009709385

Institution formation in public goods games

Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 2006

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both...