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Competition as a socially desirable dilemma theory vs. experimental evidence

Engel, Christoph - 2009

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266995

Taxation and the Sustainability of Collusion: Ad Valorem versus Specific Taxes

Azacis, Helmuts; Collie, David R. - 2014

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504466

Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry

von Auer, Ludwig; Pham, Tu Anh - In: Journal of Economics 140 (2023) 3, pp. 181-207

Surveys of antitrust cases reveal that colluding firms usually (1) attempt to minimise the risk of prosecution, (2) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some independently acting firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and exits. In contrast, existing oligopoly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015166281

Optimal destabilization of cartels

von Auer, Ludwig; Pham, Tu Anh - In: Journal of Regulatory Economics 59 (2021) 2, pp. 175-192

This paper introduces an oligopoly model that includes three actors: a cartel (comprising two or more firms that … operate like one merged company), a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. The cartel …. The cartel is internally stable if none of its member firms finds it profitable to become a fringe firm. The antitrust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501869

The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian - 2012

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for protable and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant rm are most effective in this regard....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311055

R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Sempere-Monerris, … - 2005

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312253

Abuse of Competitive Fringe

Capuano, Carlo - 2005

The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312265

Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers

Deroian, Frédéric - 2005

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully internalize the shared knowledge. When spillovers are local and transit through the network of alliances, stable architectures with a moderate level of asymmetry are identified.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312468

Incomplete Information in Cournot Oligopoly: The Case of Unknown Production Capacities

Richter, Jan - 2013

A Cournot oligopoly in which firms face incomplete information with respect to production capacities is studied. For the case where the firms’ capacities are stochastically independent, the functional form of equilibrium strategies is derived. If inverse demand is concave, a unique symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312734

Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2013

We study the bilateral exchange of information in the context of linear quadratic games. An information structure is here represented by a non directed network, whose nodes are agents and whose links represent sharing agreements. We first study the equilibrium use of information in any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010313224