In a 2 x2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives it at least a probability of one half. In a n x n symmetric game, we call a strategy globally...

We present a simple model of voluntary groups in a collective action problem where individuals differ in their willingness to cooperate. The heterogeneity of individuals' preferences generally yields multiple equilibrium groups with different levels of cooperation. Voluntary participation in a...

In an (n,m)-coordination game, each of the n players has two alternative strategies. A strategy generates positive payoff only if there are at least m-1 others who choose the same, where mn/2. The payoff is nondecreasing in the number of such others so that there are exactly two strict...

We investigate the equilibrium selection problem in n-person binary coordination games by means of adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993). The size and the depth of a particular type of basins of attraction are found to be the main factors in determining the selection outcome. The main result...

We investigate the equilibrium selection problem in n-person binary coordination games by means of the adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993). We show that whenever the difference between the deviation losses of respective equilibria is not overwhelming, the stochastic stability exhibits a...