Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive...

We consider perfectly anticipated periodic tax amnesties characterized by a tax rate lower than the ordinary one and used by a monopolistic government to maximize net fiscal revenue. We model tax amnesties as a form of intertemporal price discrimination. It turns out that, under certain...

This paper studies through an agency model the problem of concealing an illegal activity which benefits the principal. The agent can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection. We model such behavior with the assumption that the principal is risk neutral while the agent...

In metropolitan areas collective transport is often supplied by many firms and in many modes. The paper focuses on the merging of decisions about prices in two market regimes: monopoly and benevolent regulation through Ramsey pricing. The results confirm that centralization entails efficiency...