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In his "Simple model of herd behaviour", Banerjee (1992) shows that - in a sequential game - if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper we analyse the role...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124655
In his "Simple model of herd behaviour", Banerjee (1992) shows that - in a sequential game - if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper we analyse the role...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729358
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009547256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009296718
In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523582
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The aim of this paper is to analyze bidder's behavior, comparing individuals and groups' decisions within the dollar auction framework. This game induces subjects to fall prey into the paradigm of escalation, which is driven by agents' commitment to higher and higher bids. Whenever each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963490
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