This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two firms A and B who compete in the retail market, where A is more efficient than B. Prior to competition in the retail stage, firms simultaneously choose their organization structures which can be...

Vertical integration in an environment without foreclosure, or more generally without any mechanisms that restrict competition among firms, and subsidization of firms' production are two separate mechanisms that raise consumer welfare, and both have been proposed as antidotes to certain aspects...

The theory of strategic managerial delegation has recently been extended by incorporating bargaining over managerial contracts (van Witteloostuijn et.al 2007, etc). Assuming that bargaining involves only the incentive rates of managers, this line of research has shown that market outcomes...

This paper analyzes the core of cooperative games generated by asymmetric aggregative normal-form games, i.e., games where the payoff of each player depends on his strategy and the sum of the strategies of all players. We assume that each coalition calculates its worth presuming that the outside...

This paper proposes simple tax policies that can alleviate the distortive effects of royalties. We consider a Cournot duopoly under decreasing returns where one of the firms has a patented technology that it can license to its rival using combinations of royalties and fixed fees. Under optimal...

We revisit cooperative games with externalities, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We define the worth of a coalition assuming that its members have probabilistic beliefs over the coalitional behavior of the outsiders,...