We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f -optimal outcome. We show that restricted...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We...

We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted...

We consider the problem of sharing a divisible good, where agents prefer more to less. First, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next, by constructing a system...

We explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity, a...

In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism....

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and interdependent values. This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice function to be ex post self-implementable in general environments. A social choice function is ex post self-implementable if...

This paper proposes new necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Our result says that especially in certain environments including matching environments, restricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation.Our application of the result to a...