The empirical saddlepoint distribution provides an approximation to the sampling distributions for the GMM parameter estimates and the statistics that test the overidentifying restrictions. The empirical saddlepoint distribution permits asymmetry, non-normal tails, and multiple modes. If...

We study deviations from the Law-of-One-Price using microeconomic data on the retail prices of approximately 220 individual goods and services across 122 cities located in 79 countries over the period from 1990 to 2000.

This paper provides a step-by-step guide to solving dynamic stochastic games using the homotopy method. The homotopy method facilitates exploring the equilibrium correspondence in a systematic fashion; it is especially useful in games that have multiple equilibria. We discuss the theory of the...

Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously...

The propagation properties of the standard search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment are significantly altered when vacancy costs require some external financing on frictional credit markets. The latter induce variation in the shadow cost of external funds of the cycle that greatly...

This paper shows in an economy with search on credit and labor markets that a financial multiplier raises the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks, and that this multiplier is an increasing function of total financial costs in the economy. Under a credit market...

We study the quantitative properties of constrained e¢ cient allocations in an environ- ment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productiv- ity have a component that is public...

We study how the presence of non-exclusive contracts limits the amount of insurance provided in a decentralized economy. We consider a dynamic Mirrleesian economy in which agents are privately informed about idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. Agents sign privately observable insurance...