We model competition in an emissions trading system (ETS) as a game between two firms and environmental group. In a previous stage, firms endogenously choose their manufacturing technologies. Our results show that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between how polluting the chosen...

We model a market with environmentally conscious consumers and a duopoly in which firms consider the adoption of a clean technology. We show that as pollution increases, consumers shift more resources to the environmental activities, thereby affecting negatively the demand faced by the duopoly....

This paper analyses the behaviour, influence and role of third parties in tradable permits markets. Following the literature, it focuses on a framework in order to understand how society and third parties react against the firms' emissions due to their participation in the tradable permits'...

I investigate the influence of the union structure on firms' environmental technological choice when the unions care for the environmental protection. Specifically, I compare the decentralised with the centralised structure under a Cournot duopoly. I show that the decentralised structure could...

We consider a Cournot duopoly consisting of two geographically separated firms, each associated with a local environmental-friendly trade union that exhibits climate solidarity. In the basic model, firms choose abatement technologies prior to bargaining over wages and employment with the unions....

This paper presents a model based on the Nash bargaining for fishing quotas and wages between fishing communities and vessels, focusing on two cases: (a) the fishing communities are not environmentally conscious and ignore the external damages caused by the fishing industry emissions, and (b)...