In this paper we analyse contributions to a public good within an inter-generational framework where at the end of each session one generation of subjects leave advice for the succeeding generation via free form messages. Such advice can be private (advice left by one player in generation t is...

We adopt an inter-generational approach to the public goods game where one generation of subjects leave advice for the succeeding generation via free form messages. Such advice can be private knowledge (advice left by one player in generation t is given only to her immediate successor in...

We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in...

We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in...

In this paper we analyze the factors that affect the choice of land tenure contracts in the semi arid tropics of India. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model with one-sided private information to explain the co-existence of wage, rent and share-cropping contracts. We generate empirically...

Increasing the share of women in politics is regularly promoted as a means of reducing corruption. In this paper, we look for evidence of a gender gap in dishonesty among elected representatives, as well as how this changes with time in office. Based on a sample of 356 inexperienced and...