We conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing. In each auction, the good is randomly allocated to each of the k highest bidders, at the (k+1)st highest price. As the degree of rationing increases, the theoretical winner's curse decreases, and the equilibrium bid function...

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of producing a high-quality good by providing costly effort. We demonstrate that, when the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost...

We present stylized facts on the asset pricing properties of cryptocurrencies: summary statistics on cryptocurrency return properties and measures of common variation for secondary market returns on 222 digital coins. In our sample, secondary market returns of all other currencies are strongly...