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Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions

Blumrosen, Liad; Nisan, Noam - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 3, pp. 1203-1223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697110

Algorithmic mechanism design : through the lens of multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498308

(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Blumrosen, Liad; Dobzinski, Shahar - In: Games and economic behavior 130 (2021), pp. 369-383

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012820348

Mechanism design with a restricted action space

Blumrosen, Liad; Feldman, Michal - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 424-443

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243694

The communication burden of payment determination

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael - In: Games and economic behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 153-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009709383

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad - In: Games and economic behavior 63 (2008) 2, pp. 588-620

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736913

Auctions with online supply

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Roth, Aaron - In: Games and economic behavior 90 (2015), pp. 227-246

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383940

Selling spectrum in the presence of shared networks : the case of the Israeli 5G auction

Blumrosen, Liad; Solan, Eilon - In: Telecommunications policy : the international journal … 47 (2023) 2, pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014249161

Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items

Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam - 2005

In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that they have different expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. Players arrive at different times, and wish to buy one item before...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009450292

Elections Can be Manipulated Often

Friedgut, Ehud; Kalai, Gil; Nisan, Noam - David K. Levine - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708271