This paper attempts to detect the existence of links in consumptionpreferences between generations. Preferences for consumption goods may bedetermined by the preferences of parents (vertical transmission) and/or bypreferences arising from the environment (horizontal transmission). Wepropose an...

This paper studies the economic determinants, from an aggregate perspective, of Spanishinterregional labor force flows. Its main characteristics are that it is based on a matching model ofthe labor market applied to migration, and that uses gross flows instead of net ones as otherstudies do....

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first some voters are policy motivated and some are "impressionable" - their vote depends directly on campaign...

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform...

We put in perspective two competing hypothesis on the nature of intergenerational transfers: altruism vs. exchange motivation. Unlike previous approaches, we concentrate on non-monetary transfers measured as the effort that parents need to make in order to prevent children?s fatal health...

We propose a two-region two-sector model of uneven development,where technological change benefits either the lagging or the leading region. Inthis framework inter-regional transfers may lead to persistentunderdevelopment; by raising wages, transfers reduce the chance of thebackward region...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with incomplete information is developed.It is assumed that voters care about the distribu-tion of votes among the two candidates. Votershave an incomplete infor-mation about the distribution of voters´ types. We provide conditions...

We develop a dynamic political model of dividing a fixed amount of money among n districts. There are two political parties that make proposals on such divisions and compete in each district. Each district elects a representative to a legislature. Each party is governed by its representatives...

Our analysis yields some conclusions about the political role of regions in the formation of supranational economic areas, which turns out to be quite different from the role of nations. The claim that regions have more incentives than nations to attain a fiscal agreement implying full economic...

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on...