This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The best response of a coalition is defined to be a correspondence from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. From every best...

This paper shows that the presence of different types of players { those who only care abouttheir own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions { can explain the robustfeatures of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without thepresence of...

This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price...

This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price...

This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The best response of a coalition is defined to be a correspondence from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. From every best...

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...

This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...