We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

It is commonly assumed that identification with a social group is constant throughout the play of a one-shot game in the absence of feedback. We provide evidence which challenges this assumption. We direct subjects to play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. These versions are...

We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...