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incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844237
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100711
providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252
We compare the wage costs of providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers are envious, either scheme may be the least cost one owing to the trade-off between the dissatisfaction with the prospect of unequal pay and the incentives it generates Nous comparons...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100898
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives … wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten … to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467139
We use numbers of Covid-related tweets over Dutch regions in month 1-9 of 2020. Peaks in tweets precede the peaks of infections by about one month (the exception is June when the corona emergency law (“Spoedwet”) was introduced, which drew a lot of online comments. The reason for this time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015261287
We show that, in a multi-agent contract setting, the principal can effectively rule out tacit collusion among agents (i.e., “bad” equilibrium) by posting permanent job openings to an external labor market. That is, a simple “market-like” employment mechanism can yield collusion-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187025
We propose a theory to explain the choice between nominal and indexed labor contracts. We find that contracts should be indexed if prices are difficult to forecast and nominal otherwise. Our analysis is based on a principal-agent model developed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122274
We consider the cost of providing incentives using tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … workers, but he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084767