In this paper we investigate the claim that decisions from \textit{experience} (in which the features of lotteries are learned through a sampling process) differ from decisions from \textit{description} (in which features of lotteries are explicitly described). We find that the...

According to prospect theory, people overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events. Several recent papers (notably, Hertwig, Barron, Weber \& Erev, 2004) have argued that although this pattern holds for ``description-based'' decisions, in which people are explicitly...

This paper extends previous research showing that experienced difficulty of recall can influence evaluative judgments (e.g., Winkielman \& Schwarz, 2001) to a field study of university students rating a course. Students completed a mid-course evaluation form in which they were asked to list...

Many psychology experiments show that individually judged probabilities of the same event can vary depending on the partition of the state space (a framing effect called partition-dependence). We show that these biases transfer to competitive prediction markets in which multiple informed traders...

We argue that people intuitively distinguish epistemic (knowable) uncertainty from aleatory (random) uncertainty and show that the relative salience of these dimensions is reflected in natural language use. We hypothesize that confidence statements (e.g., “I am fairly confident,” “I am 90%...

People view uncertain events as knowable in principle (epistemic uncertainty), as fundamentally random (aleatory uncertainty), or as some mixture of the two. We show that people make more extreme probability judgments (i.e., closer to 0 or 1) for events they view as entailing more epistemic...