We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...

We apply a spatial model that includes both circular-city and linear-city models as special cases to the analysis of location-quantity model in mixed oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium pattern continuously moves from that of the circular-city to that of the linear-city and that the...

We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...

This study assesses the conditions under which sequential mergers can emerge in a partially privatized oligopoly with differentiated goods. In particular, it examines:(i) the optimal merger strategies by potential merging firms, (ii) optimal merger policy, and (iii) privatization policy of...

We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...