Revised: 2007-01.-- Published as an article in: Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad (2006), Semestre II, pp. 245-260.

This paper explores the role of social integration on altruistic behavior. To this aim, we develop a two-stage experimental protocol based on the classic Dictator Game. In the first stage, we ask a group of 77 undergraduate students in Economics to elicit their social network; in the second...

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of...

This paper uses subjects٠self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot travelerٳ dilemma experiment (TD). Principal components (PC) analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels,...

To be published in: Revista Internacional de Sociología (2011), Special Issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics.

Empirical results are presented showing that people who acknowledge pain anticipation when expecting an injury experience higher sensitivity to pain (GREP, Robinson et al., 2001). The positive correlation between sensitivity and anticipation is highly significant. However, no relationship is...

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Building on Item Response Theory we introduce students٠optimal behavior in multiple-choice tests. Our simulations indicate that the optimal penalty is relatively high, because although correction for guessing discriminates against risk-averse subjects, this effect is small compared with the...

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into...