Before joining the European Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have to adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of legal rules developed in the Union. The paper outlines an economic theory of optimum legal areas, that is used to determine the optimal size of the Union as well...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...

Drawing on a new analytical framework provided by the economic theory of optimal legal areas, this paper identifies the factors determining the optimal size of the European Union. It applies this theory to the question of how enlargement affects the welfare of the current and the new members of...

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'....

Die jüngsten Reformen im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht geben Anlaß, sich erneut mit Grundsatzfragen der Wettbewerbspolitik zu beschäftigen. Unter Rückgriff auf die moderne Wettbewerbstheorie, die Industrie- und die Neue Institutionenökonomik werden in diesem Paper die Grundlagen eines...

Drawing on Transaction Costs Economics, this paper develops a new approach to conflict of law rules. It outlines a concept of constitutional uncertainty in international trade and presents a model of international transactions in the presence of a diversity of legal orders. We develop a general...

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

In Economics, as in any social science, empirical tests of theoretical results face a problem: researchers are unable to reproduce the whole economy (or at least its relevant parts) in their laboratories. Nowadays, Experimental Economics uses stylized experiments, drawing on the experience of...

Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax...

According to a new European Union directive, artists, whose works are resold, are entitled to a share of the sales price. The principal aim of this initiative is to let the artists participate in the economic success of their work. Our analysis shows that the new directive is most likely to...