We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term -logit...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term --logit...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term —logit...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term —logit...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term - logit...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term —logit...

In an exchange economyw ith a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistakefree) process consist of (i) all core...