A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have...

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an...

The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting...

Purpose: This paper aims to explore consumers’ experienced life and studies how practices interconnect and are organized on a daily basis. The objective is to contribute to a better understanding of how (or whether) it is possible to interfere with daily practices, as public policies pretend...

This special issue is a collection of papers that address three questions of critical importance to the design of eco-labeling marketing strategies and policies. These three questions deal respectively with the efficiency of eco-labels when considering market structure and trade, the credibility...