This paper contributes to the finance-growth literature by examining the political economy origins of some of the most successful financial markets in Europe and Asia. It provides historical evidence from London, Amsterdam and Hong Kong that highlights the essential role played by the government...

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

We put forward a modern version of the 'developmental' view of government-owned banks which shows that the combination of information asymmetries and weak institutions creates scope for such banks to play a growth-promoting role. We present new cross-country evidence consistent with our...

The paper reviews recent literature on the relationship between finance and growth, highlighting areas where we need to know more. The paper argues that institutions, such as financial regulation, have a first-order effect on financial development and growth, and that their effectiveness could...

We show that previous results suggesting that government ownership of banks is associated with lower long run growth rates are not robust to adding more “fundamental” determinants of economic growth. We also present new cross-country evidence for 1995- 2007 which suggests that, if anything,...

Using a suitably modified locational model of banking, we examine the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract enforcement, in explaining the share of government owned banks in the banking system. We present cross-country evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively...