In this paper, we analyze the interaction between an incumbent firm's financial contract with abank and its product market decisions in the face of the threat of entry, in a dynamic model.The main results of the paper are: there exists a separating equilibrium with no limit pricing; thelow-cost...

We propose a new methodology for structural estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. We combine the Dynamic Programming (DP) solution algorithm with the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm into a single algorithm that solves the DP problem and estimates the parameters...

This paper provides a step-by-step guide to estimating discrete choice dynamic programming (DDP) models using the Bayesian Dynamic Programming algorithm developed in Imai, Jain and Ching (2008) (IJC). The IJC method combines the DDP solution algorithm with the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo...

In this paper, we summarize the findings of a series of our papers on the relationship between financial contracting and the game of entry-deterrence in a dynamic context.The incumbent has private information about its cost and enters into an agency relationship with a lender in each of the two...

We propose a new methodology for structural estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. We combine the Dynamic Programming (DP) solution algorithm with the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm into a single algorithm that solves the DP problem and estimates the parameters...

Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt on managerial compensation and performance targets. In this model, compensation has two roles to play – providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt acts as a...