Similar Search Results

Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret

Brisset, Karine; Naegelen, Florence - In: Topics in Theoretical Economics 6 (2006) 1

This paper considers the optimality of setting a secret reserve price in ascending auctions. Contrary to intuition, an ascending auction is no longer equivalent to a second price auction when the reserve price is secret. We determine the seller's optimal reserve price policy when the bidders'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589077

Leniency program : a new tool in competition policy to deter cartel activity in procurement auctions

Brisset, Karine; Thomas, Lionel - In: European journal of law and economics 17 (2004) 1, pp. 5-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001891058

Is amnesty plus more successful in fighting multimarket cartels? : an exploratory analysis

Brisset, Karine; Cochard, Francois; Lambert, Eve-Angeline - In: Review of industrial organization 63 (2023) 2, pp. 211-237

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014384022

Why the reserve price should not be kept secret

Brisset, Karine (contributor); … - In: Topics in theoretical economics 6 (2006) 1, pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003338275

Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? : experimental evidence

Brisset, Karine; Cochard, François; Maréchal, François - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 78 (2015) 4, pp. 639-665

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485044

The effect of a right-of-first-refusal clause in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk-averse bidders

Brisset, Karine; Cochard, François; Maréchal, François - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 176 (2020) 3, pp. 526-548

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593899