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In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790951
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by sequences of discount factors varying in time. We determine subgame perfect equilibria for three cases when the strike decision of the union is exogenous :...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649761
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time. For such a wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences, we determine subgame perfect equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530197
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408198
A spatial model of coalition formation is used together with data from Dutch elections and theoretical instances to study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647514
We generalize a two-action (yes-no) model of influence to a framework in which every player has a continuum of actions, among which he has to choose one. We assume the set of actions to be an interval. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to influence among players,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647519
A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members of the society called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321692
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper we present relational models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some game-theoretic basic problems. The algorithms immediately can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321696
We deliver a short overview of di erent centrality measures and influence concepts in social networks, and present the relation-algebraic approach to the concepts of power and influence. First, we briefly discuss four kinds of measures of centrality: the ones based on degree, closeness,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321708