Governments use coercion to aggregate distributed information relevant to governmental objectives-from the prosecution of regime-stability threats to terrorism or epidemics. A cohesive social structure facilitates this task, as reliable information will often come from friends and acquaintances....

This paper develops a model to study the formation and regulation of information transmission networks. We analyze a cat and mouse game between a regulator, who sets and enforces a regulatory environment, and agents, who form networks to disseminate and share insider information. For any given...

This paper presents a framework to study the technological resiliency of financial system architecture. Financial market infrastructures, or platforms, compete with services that play critical functions along various stages in the lifecycle of a trade, and make investments in technological...

To account for the development patterns that differ considerably among economies in the long run, a variety of one-sector models that incorporate some degree of market imperfections based on technological external effects and increasing returns have been presented. This paper studies the dynamic...

To account for the development patterns that differ considerably among economies in the long run, a variety of one-sector models that incorporate some degree of market imperfections based on technological external effects and increasing returns have been presented. This paper studies the dynamic...

Dealing with pandemics, such as the recent COVID-19 virus, has highlighted the critical role of social distancing to avoid contagion and deaths. New technologies that allow replacing in-person for at-distance activities have blurred the mapping between social and economic distancing. In this...

Recent regulations in the U.S. and Europe incentivize the use of central counterparty clearing houses (CCP) to clear derivatives, arguably to create a less complex and more transparent interbank network that is less prone to financial instabilities. We construct a network model with endogenous...

This paper introduces a novel form of moral hazard specific to networks and illustrates this concept using simple models from coordination games, epidemics, supply chains, and financial networks. In these models, agents form beneficial links that also propagate costly contagion. Endogenously,...