insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the … loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the … loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual …

to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

beginning of modern economic analysis of insurance activity. This chapter reviews the main theoretical and empirical … contributions in insurance economics since that time. The review begins with the role of utility, risk, and risk aversion in the … insurance literature and summarizes work on the demand for insurance, insurance and resource allocation, moral hazard, and …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals' demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

Funeral Aid Associations (FAAs) in Northeast Thailand offer micro funeral insurance at affordable premium levels while … the insurance. Compared to many other micro insurance schemes, however, FAAs do not seem to face adverse effects of this … of a sufficient number of low-risk individuals, who deliberately buy insurance despite what their risk types would advice …

's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique …