We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium,...

This paper focuses on how developing countries can change the way they prepare for disasters so they are better equipped to sustain economic growth. It discusses the importance of considering the goals of key decision makers and the need to understand the perceptions, systematics biases, and...

When a spot market monopolist participates in the futures market, he has an incentive to adjust spot prices to make his futures market position more pro…table. Rational futures market makers take this into account when they set prices. Spot market power thus creates a moral hazard problem...

Limited liability creates a conict of interests between policyholders and shareholders ofinsurance companies. It provides shareholders with incentives to increase the risk of theinsurer's assets and liabilities which, in turn, might reduce the value policyholders attach toand premiums they are...

Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group...

Mutual insurance companies and stock insurance companies are different forms of organized risk sharing: policyholders and owners are two distinct groups in a stock insurer, while they are one and the same in a mutual. This distinction is relevant to raising capital, selling policies, and sharing...