When risks are interdependent, loss-prevention activities of one agent influence the risks faced by others. The social return to an investment in loss-prevention is greater than the private return. From a perspective of social welfare, the market allocation is not optimal and leads to...

This article deals with the impact of intermediaries on insurance market transparancy and performance. In a market exhibiting product diferentiation and coexistence of of perfectly and imperfectly informed consumers, competition among insurers leads to non-existence of a pure-strategy market...

Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert die optimale Prämienpolitik eines Versicherers bei stochastischer Verteilung der Nachfragertypen auf Basis einer Preis-Absatz-Funktion. Dem Versicherer ist hier lediglich die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der individuellen Nachfragertypen bekannt und eine...

When risks are interdependent, an agent's decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on...

The present paper analyzes the demand for insurance when the insurer has incomplete information about types of potential customers. We assume that customers' risk preferences cannot be distinguished by the insurer. Therefore, the standard result in insurance economics that the insurer...

We study the relationship between risk managers' dark triad personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and their selective hedging activities. Using a primary survey of 412 professional risk managers, we find that managers with dark personality traits are more likely to...