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Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350825
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761639
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491446
higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777646
close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012502
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274917
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477