We study third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets, in which costs of production for the downstream firms are determined by their investment choices. We focus on the effect of the sequence of firm actions and analyze two models with different timing of investments, before or...

Though government intervention is prevalent in the market for research and development (R&D), most literature has focused on the use of subsidies, patents or joint research ventures to obtain the efficient R&D investment. By using a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose the level...

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard-conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non-discriminatory...

Antitrust laws in many countries prohibit the setting of differential prices across buyers who compete against each other. In this paper, we consider a setting in which a downstream manufacturer holds non-controlling stakes in its rival and both buy input from an unptream monopolist. We find...