This paper analyzes the efficiency of the Price Cap regulatory scheme and its impact on universal access, when the monopolist is allowed to set a menu of alternative plans as part of a self-selection strategy (second-degree price discrimination) and the cap is calculated as the weighted average...

We show how collusive outcomes may occur in equilibrium in a one-period competitive insurance market characterized by adverse selection. We build on the Inderst and Wambach (2001) model and assume that insurees must pay a minimum premium, which is a common feature in many health systems. In this...

We propose and estimate a model of demand and supply of annuities. To this end, we use rich data from Chile, where annuities are bought and sold in a private market via a two-stage process: first-price auctions followed by bargaining. We model firms with private information about costs and...

We propose and estimate a model of demand and supply of annuities. To this end, we use rich data from Chile, where annuities are bought and sold in a private market via a two-stage process: first-price auctions followed by bargaining. We model firms with private information about costs and...

Frequent flier programs create a switching cost for the consumer and allow firms to exercise market power. In Chile there is a dominant airline in domestic markets that has a frequent flyer program with a large number of affiliates and it faces some competition from two small carriers that do...