Showing 1 - 10 of 20
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291593
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752418
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512633
We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266403
The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328463
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335039
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599449
The behavior of men and women in a number of games free of social issues is explored. The analysis is conducted for simple (2x2) and complex (guessing) games and in static and repeated settings. No gender effect is observed either in static nor in repeated games. It is concluded that gender bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005455470
In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819500
The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493836