The theory of repeated games offers a compelling rationale for cooperation in a variety of environments. Yet, its consequences for collective decision-making have been largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior...

We study the fair allocation of a one-dimensional and perfectly divisible good when individuals have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness?...

Consider a database of academic papers where each paper has a scientific worth and a group of authors. We propose a new way of measuring individual academic productivity by evaluating authorship, the extent of an author's contribution to each paper. Our method, CoScore, uses the varying levels...

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints...