We study the dependence of health insurance availability of near-elderly inpatients in the United States with respect to their ages. We show that the likelihood that near-elderly inpatients are uninsured continuously declines until the early ages of 60 but the trend is reversed for the last few...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...

Being the leader in a group often involves making risky decisions that affect the payoffs of all members, and the decision to take this responsibility in a group is endogenous in many contexts. In this paper, we experimentally study: (1) the willingness of men and women to make risky decisions...

We study the dependence of health insurance availability of near-elderly inpatients in the United States with respect to their ages. We show that the likelihood that near-elderly inpatients are uninsured continuously declines until the early ages of 60 but the trend is reversed for the last few...

This study empirically examines a sample of national wireless spectrum assignments for the period 2000-2007 to identify the sources of revenue variations. An econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz) values to auction design...

To evaluate the costs and benefits of various anti-smoking policy alternatives including taxation and four cessation programs, accounting for the demographic projections in 2011-2050 in Turkey. Demographic projections are combined with incidence and mortality rates of four major cigarette...

We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game (the Choice Game). We find that the...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...