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The present paper develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155369
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013466752
In this paper, we analyze some aspects of cronyism and corruption in India. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model where the ruling political party and a capitalist interact with each other. The ruling party, in return of a donation from the capitalist, sets a policy that favors the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013297162
In this paper we analyze some aspects of cronyism and corruption in an emerging economy. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model where the ruling political party and a capitalist interact with each other. The ruling party, in return of a donation from the capitalist, sets a policy that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322542
The present paper develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218701
We develop a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets which highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229864
This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015240829
We develop a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets which highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015240861