We consider a pure exchange economy, with incomplete financial markets, where agents face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agents forms price anticipations on each spot market,...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete nominal-asset markets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre [3] introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information setting the classical concepts of symmetric information. In...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...

Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers [2,3,4,5,6] had extended to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory [1,7,10], under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of "no-arbitrage" prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study its...