This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of multiple-ptiors utility. A central axiom is dynamic consistency, which leads to a recursive structure for utility, to 'rectangular' sets of priors and to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. It is argued...

The Ellsberg paradox suggests that people's behavior is different in risky situations - when they are given objective probabilities - from their behavior in ambiguous situations - when they are not told the odds (as is typical in financial markets). Such behavior is inconsistent with subjective...

The Ellsberg paradox suggests that people behave differently in risky situations -- when they are given objective probabilities -- than in ambiguous situations when they are not told the odds (as is typical in financial markets). Such behavior is inconsistent with subjective expected utility...

"The Ellsberg paradox suggests that people behave differently in risky situations -- when they are given objective probabilities -- than in ambiguous situations when they are not told the odds (as is typical in financial markets). Such behavior is inconsistent with subjective expected utility...