Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the...

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this...

Interactive epistemology in dynamic games studies forms of strategic reasoning like backward induction and forward induction by formally representing the players' beliefs about each other, conditional on each history. Work on this topic typically relies on epistemic models where states of the...

We analyze forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information assuming some commonly understood restrictions on beliefs. Specifically, we assume that some given restrictions ? on players' initial or conditional first-order beliefs are transparent, that is, not only the restrictions...