This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

Tribute to Jean-Yves Jaffray by the French Group of Decision Theory

We suscribe to an account of framing-effects in decision theory in terms of an inference to a background informationa by the hearer when a speaker uses a certain frame while other equivalent frames were also available. This account was sketched by Craig McKenzie. We embed it in Bolker-Jeffrey...

We axiomatize a model of decision under objective ambiguity or imprecise risk. The decision maker forms a subjective (non necessarily additive) belief aboutthe likelihood of probability distributions and computes the average expected utility of a given act with respect to this second order...

We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray's work, that explicitly incorporating the information, however imprecise, available to the decision marker is relevant, feasible and fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and...